Synopsis
CVE-2022-38129 - addLicenseFile Path Traversal RCE (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/
A path traversal vulnerability exists in the com.keysight.tentacle.
The attacker can remotely invoke the addLicenseFile() method via URL endpoint /server/service/
The method checks if the license file name contains a Windows file separator to ensure the file is saved in <SMS_DIR>\licenses\:
// com.keysight.tentacle.
public LicenseError addLicenseFile(
if (paramLicenseDescription == null)
return LicenseError.INVALID_FILENAME;
String str = paramLicenseDescription.
if (str == null || str.length() == 0)
return LicenseError.INVALID_FILENAME;
if (str.contains(File.separator))
return LicenseError.PATHNAME_NOT_
byte[] arrayOfByte = paramLicenseDescription.
if (arrayOfByte == null || arrayOfByte.length == 0)
return LicenseError.INVALID_LICENSE_
ByteArrayInputStream byteArrayInputStream = new ByteArrayInputStream(
File file = new File("licenses/" + str);
FileOutputStream fileOutputStream = null;
LicenseError licenseError = LicenseError.UNKNOWN;
BufferedOutputStream bufferedOutputStream = null;
try {
fileOutputStream = new FileOutputStream(file);
bufferedOutputStream = new BufferedOutputStream(
byte[] arrayOfByte1 = new byte[1024];
int i = 0;
while ((i = byteArrayInputStream.read(
bufferedOutputStream.write(
licenseError = LicenseError.OK;
} catch (FileNotFoundException fileNotFoundException) {
licenseError = LicenseError.FILE_WRITE_ERROR;
} catch (IOException iOException) {
licenseError = LicenseError.FILE_WRITE_ERROR;
} finally {
try {
if (bufferedOutputStream != null)
bufferedOutputStream.close();
if (fileOutputStream != null)
fileOutputStream.close();
} catch (IOException iOException) {
licenseError = LicenseError.FILE_WRITE_ERROR;
}
}
return licenseError;
}
However, the check can be bypassed with forward slashes (i.e., ../). The attacker can use path traversal in the license file name to upload an attacker-controlled file to any location on the SMS host. For example, the attacker can upload a reverse shell TCP payload, save it as <SMS_DIR>\ping.exe, and then invoke com.keysight.tentacle.config.
The sensorPing() method executes the attacker-supplied ping.exe instead of C:\Windows\System32\ping.exe because the current directory of the SMS process (KeysightSMS.exe) is <SMS_DIR>, and sensorPing() does not use an absolute path when calling ping.exe:
// com.keysight.tentacle.config.
public List<String> sensorPing(String paramString) {
LinkedList<String> linkedList = new LinkedList();
String str = "";
try {
Process process = Runtime.getRuntime().exec("
<...snip...>
CVE-2022-38130 - smsRestoreDatabaseZip UNC Path RCE (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/
The com.keysight.tentacle.config.
An HSQLDB database includes a script file containing SQL statements to be executed to make up the database. During method execution, the SQL statements in the script file are executed. The attacker can put arbitrary SQL statements in the script to cause them to be executed.
For example, since HSQLDB can call Java static methods, the attacker can use the following SQL statements to load an attacker-controlled DLL into the process executing the script file, achieving unauthenticated RCE.
Solution
Apply the vendor-supplied patch.
Disclosure Timeline
All information within TRA advisories is provided “as is”, without warranty of any kind, including the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, and with no guarantee of completeness, accuracy, or timeliness. Individuals and organizations are responsible for assessing the impact of any actual or potential security vulnerability.
Tenable takes product security very seriously. If you believe you have found a vulnerability in one of our products, we ask that you please work with us to quickly resolve it in order to protect customers. Tenable believes in responding quickly to such reports, maintaining communication with researchers, and providing a solution in short order.
For more details on submitting vulnerability information, please see our Vulnerability Reporting Guidelines page.
If you have questions or corrections about this advisory, please email [email protected]